Wednesday Lilyo of Holy Week: Lamy, 1. Thursday Lilyo of Holy Week: Lamy, 1. French translation, E. Friday Lilyo of Holy Week: Lamy, 1. English translation in D. Sheerin , The Eucharist. Wilmington: M. Glazier, Friday Sapro of the Crucifixion: Lamy, 1. Saturday Lilyo of Holy Week: Lamy, 1. New Sunday Lilyo : Lamy, 1. English translation in M. Hansbury , Hymns of Saint Ephrem the Syrian. London: SLG Press, Italian translation in I. Magnano: Monastero di Bose, Memre on Joseph In 12 Books, also attributed to Balai. Complete editions in P. Earlier editions: J.
Lamy , Sancti Ephraem Syri hymni et sermones quos e codicibus Londinensibus, Parisiensibus et Oxoniensibus descriptos edidit, Latinitate donavit, variis lectionibus instruxit, notis et prolegomenis illustravit 3 , vol. Books I—10 are also to be found in G. Hopkins and Brock, S. Reprinted in S. Brock , Ed. Ashgate: Aldershot, The text is also given in S.
English translation, S. French translation in B. Outtier , Ed. Lavenant , Ed. Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, English translation in A. French translation in D. Translations of individual hymns: Eccl. Italian translation in K. See also S. Brock and Kiraz, G. Provo: Brigham Young University Press, McLean: St. Athanasius' Coptic Pub. Centre, Translated in K.
McVey , Ephrem the Syrian: Hymns. New York: Paulist Press, They are numbered 8—13 1—7 are lost. These correspond to Hymns 1—6, Lamy, 3. There is an English translation of the last hymn, on Shmoni and her seven sons the Maccabean martyrs in R. Bensly and Barnes, W. French translation in F. Paris: cerf. Milan: Paoline, cop, Translations of individual hymns: Cruc. Rouwhorst , Efrem de Syrier: hymnen voor de viering van het kerkelijk jaar. Beck considers only a few to be genuine. His edition replaces that in Lamy I which has a different numbering of the hymns. English translation J.
Romanian translation in I. Sibiu: Deisis, Translations of individual hymns: Epiph. English translation of the complete collection in J. There are unpublished complete English translations by A. French translation, F. For the question of interpolated stanzas, see Palmer c, f, g, i. Translations of individual hymns: Fid. Brock , A Hymn on the Eucharist: hymns on faith, no.
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Coakley, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, Palmer, in A. Palmer , J. Boeft, den , and Hilhorst, A. Brill, , pp. Italian translation in P. London: Bell, Pereira , Studies in Aramaic poetry c. Assen: Van Gorcum, Polet and Longton, J. Bruxelles: De Boeck , Italian translation in E. Vergani , Efrem il Siro: Il dono della perla. Spanish translation in F. Lamy , Sancti Ephraem Syri hymni et sermones quos e codicibus Londinensibus, Parisiensibus et Oxoniensibus descriptos edidit, Latinitate donavit, variis lectionibus instruxit, notis et prolegomenis illustravit 2 , vol.
Cerbelaud , Hymnes sur le jeune. Vergani , La restituzione del debito, Melodie e istruzioni sul Digiuno. Milan: Centro ambrosiano, Milan: Edizioni Paoline, Translations of individual hymns: Iei. Translations of individual hymns: Haer. Jansma , Natuur, lot en vrijheid: Bardesanes, de filosoof der Arameers en zijn images. Wageningen: Veenmann, English translation, McVey and Lieu in K. McVey and Lieu, S. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, Russian translation in A.
Muraviev , Mar Ephrem of Nisibis St. Ephrem the Syrian : Julian's Cycles. Complete English translation in K. Beck 9 stanza 2 fol. Beck 10 st. McVey's numbering is of course the same as Beck's. Hindo and Saleh, C. Paris: L'Harmattan, Arabic translation with vocalized serto text in Y.
Translations of individual hymns: Nat. Dutch translation in K. Laurentin and Yousif, P. Bickell , S. Ephraemi Syri carmina Nisibena additis prolegomenis et supplemento lexicorum Syriacorum. Leipzig: F. Brockhaus, Sarsfield Stopford of hymns 1—21, 35—42, and 62—68 in J. Translated into English with prolegomena and explanatory notes , vol.
Gwynn , Ed. French translation in P. Paris: Cariscript, Cerbelaud , La descente aux enfers: Carmina Nisibena. Godewaersvelde: Editions de Bellefontaine, Translations of individual hymns: Nis. Paris: Geuthner, , pp. Paul sur les carmina nisibena de S. French translation in R. Lavenant and Graffin, R. Hymnes sur le Paradis. Milan: Paoline, Latin translation in E.
Swedish translation in S. Hidal , Hymnerna om Paradiset. Finnish translation in S. For suggested interpolated stanzas, see A. Translations of individual hymns: Par. Cunningham , Prayer: personal and liturgical , vol. Wilmington: Glazier, Translations of individual hymns: Res. Catalan translation M. Translations of individual hymns: Azym. Ephrem : an analysis of H. English translation in K.
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Cerbelaud , Le Christ en ses symboles: Hymnes de Virginitate , vol. Translations of individual hymns: Virg. Servant and Desprez, V. Darling Young and Blanchard, M. Vergani , Le arpe del Signore. Brock , Sughyotho mgabyotho.
St. Ephrem: A Brief Guide to the Main Editions and Translations
Losser: St. Ephrem Kloster, There is an older English translation of 4, J. Paris: Firmin-Didot, Translations of individual hymns: 2—7, 9: French translation in F. Exodus Comm. Acts Latin Comm. German, French translations On the Confessors: E. Latin, German translation On the Crucifixion: E. Latin, German translations On the emperor Julian: E.
Latin, German translations; English translation of i. These were preserved thanks to the dry Egyptian climate and the bibliophile abbot Moses of Nisibis in the early decades of the tenth century. Prose Refutations: British Library, Add. Once the techniques for reading palimpsest manuscripts have become more widely available, it should be possible to gain considerably more text of the works preserved in this manuscript.
Discourse on our Lord: British Library Add. Letter to Publius: excerpt only in British Library Add. Sermones I. Sermones II. Madrashe Four manuscripts survive which are precisely dated to years within the sixth century, while five further ones probably on palaeographical grounds date to the sixth century two might even go back to the fifth. AD ; Add. On the Crucifixion: Add. On the Fast: Add. Against Julian: Add. On the Nativity: Add. AD [18 poems]. On the Nisibenes: Add. On the Resurrection: Add. On Unleavened Bread: Add. Section III.
Arabic Arabic translations of Ephrem go back to the very beginnings of Christian Arabic literature, and in some cases they also survive in early manuscripts of the ninth and tenth centuries. Normally the translations are made from the Greek Ephrem corpus, and not from Syriac. On this version, see in general G. Graf , Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur , vol. Rome: Vatican Apostolic Library, This would mean that they are required to engage philosophy on its turf, just as Ion has somewhat reluctantly done. The legitimacy of that requirement is itself a point of contention, it is one aspect of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry.
In order to respond to the famous challenge put to Socrates by Glaucon and Adeimantus, it is necessary to define justice. It turns out that philosophic guardians are to rule the polis, and the next question concerns their education e2. The concern in book II is very much with the proper education of a citizen, as befits the project of creating a model city. From the outset, Socrates treats the poems those by Hesiod and Homer are singled out, but the critique isn't meant to be confined to them as though they contained not just falsehoods, but falsehoods held up as models of good behavior.
The poems are taken as educational and thus broadly political texts; persuasion see c7 of a class of the young is very much at stake. The young cannot judge well what is true and false; since a view of things taken on at early age is very hard to eradicate or change, it is necessary to ensure that they hear only myths that encourage true virtue d7-e3. Thus while the critique of poetry in book II and beyond is in this sense shaped by the contextual concerns, it is not limited to them. The scope of the critique is breathtaking.
Along the way Socrates makes yet another point of great importance, namely that the poets ought not be permitted to say that those punished for misdeeds are wretched; rather, they must say that in paying a just penalty, bad men are benefited by the god b2—6. Socrates is starting to push against the theses that bad people will flourish or that good people can be harmed. The cosmos is structured in such a way as to support virtue. In book III Socrates expands the argument considerably. The concern now is squarely with poetry that encourages virtue in the souls of the young.
Courage and moderation are the first two virtues considered here; the psychological and ethical effects of poetry are now scrutinized. The entire portrait of Hades must go, since it is neither true nor beneficial for auditors who must become fearless in the face of death. Death is not the worst thing there is, and all depictions of famous or allegedly good men wailing and lamenting their misfortunes must go or at least, be confined to unimportant women and to bad men; e9—a3.
The poets must not imitate see c3 for the term gods or men suffering any extremes of emotion, including hilarity, for the strong souls are not overpowered by any emotion, let along any bodily desire. Nor do they suffer from spiritual conflict c. He does so in a way that marks a new direction in the conversation. The issue turns out to be of deep ethical import, because it concerns the way in which poetry affects the soul.
Up until now, the mechanism, so to speak, has been vague; now it becomes a little bit clearer. The notion of mimesis , missing from the Ion , now takes center stage. For then the poet is likening himself to this character, and trying to make the audience believe that it's the character speaking. Some poetry comedy and tragedy are mentioned proceeds wholly by imitation, another wholly by simple narration dithyrambs are mentioned , and epic poetry combines the two forms of narrative.
What follows this classificatory scheme is a polemic against imitation. The initial thesis is that every person can do a fine job in just one activity only. Consequently, nobody can do a fine job of imitating more than one thing for example, an actor cannot be a rhapsode, a comic poet cannot be a tragic poet, if any of these is finely done.
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Imitation is itself something one does, and so one cannot both imitate X say, generalship well and also do the activity X in question eb. It has to be said that this thesis is set out with little real argument. In any case, the best souls the guardians, in this case, in the city in speech ought not imitate anything. And were they to imitate anything, every care must be taken that they are ennobled rather than degraded as a result. Unlike simple narrative, mimesis poses a particular psychic danger, because as the speaker of the narrative one may take on the character of literary persona in question.
There is no airtight barrier between throwing yourself especially habitually into a certain part, body and soul, and being molded by the part; no firm boundary, in that sense, between what happens on and off the stage. By contrast, Socrates argues, a simple narration preserves distance between narrator and narrated. Before passing onto critiques of music and gymnastic, Socrates concludes this section of his critique of poetry with the stipulation that a poet who imitates all things both good and bad in all styles cannot be admitted into the good polis.
This critique of mimetic poetry has struck not a few readers as a bit strange and obtuse, even putting aside the question of the legitimacy of censorship of the arts. It seems not to distinguish between the poet, the reciter of the poem, and the audience; no spectatorial distance is allowed to the audience; and the author is allowed little distance from the characters he is representing.
All become the speakers or performers of the poem when they say or think the lines; and speaking the poem, taking it on as it were, is alleged to have real effects on one's dispositions. In book II the critique of poetry focused on mimesis understood as representation; the fundamental point was that poets misrepresent the nature of the subjects about which they write e. They do not produce a true likeness of their topics. The renewed criticism leads up to the famous statement that there exists an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy.
Socrates posits that there are Forms or Ideas of beds and tables, the maker of which is a god; there are imitations thereof, namely beds and tables, produced by craftsmen such as carpenters who behold the Forms as though they were looking at blueprints ; thirdly, there are imitators of the products of the craftsmen, who, like painters, create a kind of image of these objects in the world of becoming.
The tripartite schema presents the interpreter with many problems. Let us focus on one of the implications of this schema, about which Socrates is quite specific. The poets don't know the originals of i. Even putting aside all of the matters relating to arts and crafts technai such as medicine , and focusing on the greatest and most important things—above all, the governance of societies and the education of a human being—Homer simply does not stand up to examination ce.
And what, apart from their own ignorance of the truth, governs their very partial perspective on the world of becoming? Socrates implies that they pander to their audience, to the hoi polloi b3—4. This links them to the rhetoricians as Socrates describes them in the Gorgias. At the same time, they take advantage of that part in us the hoi polloi are governed by; here Socrates attempts to bring his discussion of psychology, presented since book III, to bear. The ensuing discussion is remarkable in the way in which it elaborates on these theses.
How would a decent person respond to such a calamity? This may be a sketch of Socrates himself, whose imitation Plato has produced. By contrast, the tragic imitators excel at portraying the psychic conflicts of people who are suffering and who do not even attempt to respond philosophically. Since their audience consists of people whose own selves are in that sort of condition too, imitators and audience are locked into a sort of mutually reinforcing picture of the human condition. Both are captured by that part of themselves given to the non-rational or irrational; both are most interested in the condition of internal conflict.
Onlookers become emotively involved in the poet's drama. So the danger posed by poetry is great, for it appeals to something to which even the best—the most philosophical—are liable, and induces a dream-like, uncritical state in which we lose ourselves in the emotions in question above all, in sorrow, grief, anger, resentment.
That is why poetry, with its throbbing rhythms and beating of breasts, appeals equally to the nondescript mob in the theater and to the best among us. But if poetry goes straight to the lower part of the psyche, that is where it must come from. He does not separate knowledge of beauty and knowledge of good. It is as though the pleasure we take in the representation of sorrow on the stage will—because it is pleasure in that which the representation represents and not just a representation on the stage or in a poem —transmute into pleasure in the expression of sorrow in life.
And that is not only an ethical effect, but a bad one, for Plato. These are ingredients of his disagreements on the subject with Aristotle, as well as with myriad thinkers since then. The poets help enslave even the best of us to the lower parts of our soul; and just insofar as they do so, they must be kept out of any community that wishes to be free and virtuous. Famously, or notoriously, Plato refuses to countenance a firm separation between the private and the public, between the virtue of the one and the regulation of the other.
What goes on in the theater, in your home, in your fantasy life, are connected. Poetry unregulated by philosophy is a danger to soul and community. The poets have been characterized as making claims to truth, to telling it like it is, that are in fact—contrary to appearances—little more than the poet's unargued imaginative projections whose tenability is established by their ability to command the applause of the audience. That is, the poets are rhetoricians who are, as it were, selling their products to as large a market as possible, in the hope of gaining repute and influence.
The tripartite schema of Idea, artifact, and imitator is as much about making as it is about imitation. Making is a continual thread through all three levels of the schema.
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The Ideas too are said to be made , even though that is entirely inconsistent with the doctrine of Ideas as eternal expressed earlier in the Republic itself and in all the other Platonic dialogues. Their effort has to do with discovery rather than making. Forms, images vs. Nowhere in the Republic does Socrates mention the poet's claim to inspiration. Indeed, that claim is pointedly omitted in the passage in which Socrates talks about the beginnings of the Iliad e2—a5; see Bloom's note ad loc. Socrates implicitly denies the soundness of that claim here.
Given his conception of the divine as Idea, such a claim could not be true, since the Ideas do not speak, let alone speak the things which Homer, Hesiod, and their followers recount. The result is that the poets are fabricators even of the appearance of knowing what they are talking about; this is not inconsistent with the Ion 's characterization of poetry as inspired ignorance.
Does the critique of poetry in the Republic extend beyond the project of founding the just city in speech? I have already suggested an affirmative answer when discussing book II. The concerns about poetry expressed in books III and X would also extend beyond the immediate project of the dialogue, if they carry any water at all, even though the targets Plato names are of course taken from his own times. It has been argued that the authority to speak truth that poets claim is shared by many widely esteemed poets since then.
Controversies about, say, the effects of graphic depictions of violence, of the degradation of women, and of sex, echo the Platonic worries about the ethical and social effects of art. The Gorgias is one of Plato's most bitter dialogues in that the exchanges are at times full of anger, of uncompromising disagreement, plenty of misunderstanding, and cutting rhetoric. In these respects it goes beyond even the Protagoras , a dialogue that depicts a hostile confrontation between Socrates and the renowned sophist by the same name.
What is the fight about? Socrates asks Gorgias to define what it is that he does, that is, to define rhetoric. And he asks him to do it in a way that helps to distinguish rhetorical from philosophical discourse: the former produces speeches of praise and blame, the latter answers questions through the give and take of discussion dialegesthai , d10 in an effort to arrive at a concise definition, and more broadly, with the intent to understand the subject.
Gorgias is forced by successive challenges to move from the view that rhetoric is concerned with words speeches to the view that its activity and effectiveness happen only in and through words unlike the manual arts to the view that its object is the greatest of human concerns, namely freedom. But persuasion about what exactly?
Gorgias' answer is: about matters concerning justice and injustice b7. But surely there are two kinds of persuasion, one that instills beliefs merely, and another that produces knowledge; it is the former only with which rhetoric is concerned. The analogy of this argument to the critique of poetry is already clear; in both cases, Socrates wants to argue that the speaker is not a truth speaker, and does not convey knowledge to his audience.
As already noted, Socrates classifies poetry dithyrambic and tragic poetry are named as a species of rhetoric. Its goal is to gratify and please the spectator, or differently put, it is just a kind of flattery. Strip away the rhythm and meter, and you have plain prose directed at the mob. It's a kind of public speaking, that's all a6-c The rhetorician is a maker of beliefs in the souls of his auditors a3—4. And without that skill—here Gorgias begins to wax at length and eloquently—other arts such as medicine cannot do their work effectively b ff. Rhetoric is a comprehensive art.
But Gorgias offers a crucial qualification that turns out to contribute to his downfall: rhetoric should not be used against any and everybody, any more than skill in boxing should be. Although the rhetorician teaches others to use the skill justly, it is always possible for the student to misuse it. This is followed by another damaging admission: the rhetorician knows what justice, injustice, and other moral qualities are, and teaches them to the student if the student is ignorant of them a. It would follow that, in Socrates' language, the true rhetorician is a philosopher; and in fact that is a position Socrates takes in the Phaedrus.
But Gorgias is not a philosopher and does not in fact know—cannot give an account of—the moral qualities in question. So his art is all about appearing, in the eyes of the ignorant, to know about these topics, and then persuading them as is expedient cf. But this is not something Gorgias wishes to admit; indeed, he allows himself to agree that since the rhetorician knows what justice is, he must be a just man and therefore acts justly b-c.
He is caught in a contradiction: he claimed that a student who had acquired the art of rhetoric could use it unjustly, but now claims that the rhetorician could not commit injustice. All this is just too much for Gorgias' student Polus, whose angry intervention marks the second and much more bitter stage of the dialogue b3. A new point emerges that is consistent with the claim that rhetoricians do not know or convey knowledge, viz. Socrates adds that its object is to produce gratification. To develop the point, Socrates produces a striking schema distinguishing between care of the body and care of the soul.
Medicine and gymnastics truly care for the body, cookery and cosmetics pretend to but do not. Politics is the art that cares for the soul; justice and legislation are its branches, and the imitations of each are rhetoric and sophistry. As medicine stands to cookery, so justice to rhetoric; as gymnastics to cosmetics, so legislation to sophistry.
The true forms of caring are arts technai aiming at the good; the false, knacks aiming at pleasure bd. Let us note that sophistry and rhetoric are very closely allied here; Socrates notes that they are distinct but closely related and therefore often confused by people c. What exactly their distinction consists in is not clear, either in Plato's discussions of the matter, or historically.
Socrates's polemic here is intended to apply to them both, as both are alleged to amount to a knack for persuasion of the ignorant by the ignorant with a view to producing pleasure in the audience and the pleasures of power for the speaker. Socrates' ensuing argument with Polus is complicated and long. The nub of the matter concerns the relation between power and justice. For Polus, the person who has power and wields it successfully is happy. For Socrates, a person is happy only if he or she is morally good, and an unjust or evil person is wretched—all the more so, indeed, if they escape punishment for their misdeeds.
In sum: Plato's suggestion is that rhetoric and sophistry are tied to substantive theses about the irrelevance of moral truth to the happy life; about the conventionality or relativity of morals; and about the irrelevance of the sort of inquiry into the truth of the matter as distinguished from opinions or the results of polls upon which Socrates keeps insisting.
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And if these hold, what use is there in rhetoric? For someone who wishes to avoid doing himself and others harm, Socrates concludes, rhetoric is altogether useless. Tied into logical knots, Polus succumbs. All this is just too much for yet another interlocutor in the dialogue, Callicles.
The rhetoric of the Gorgias reaches its most bitter stage. Callicles presents himself as a no-holds-barred, bare-knuckled, clear-headed advocate of Realpolitik , as we would now call it. Conventional talk of justice, fairness, not taking more than is your share, not pursuing your individual best interest—these are simply ways by which the weak seek to enslave the strong. The art of rhetoric is all about empowering those who are strong by nature to master the weak by nature. Callicles' famous diatribe includes an indictment of philosophy as a childish occupation that, if pursued past youth, interferes with the manly pursuit of power, fosters contemptible ignorance of how the real political world works, and renders its possessor effeminate and defenseless.
His example is none other than Socrates; philosophy will he says prophetically render Socrates helpless should he be indicted. Helplessness in the face of the stupidity of the hoi polloi is disgraceful and pathetic a-c. By contrast, what would it mean to have power? Callicles is quite explicit: power is the ability to fulfill whatever desire you have. Power is freedom, freedom is license a-c. The capacity to do what one wants is fulfillment in the sense of the realization of pleasure.
Rhetoric is a means to that end. The quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, thus understood, ultimately addresses a range of fundamental issues. Its quarrel with philosophy is comprehensive, and bears on the nature of nature; the existence of objective moral norms; the connection if any between happiness and virtue; the nature and limits of reason; the value of reason understood as the rational pursuit of objective purpose in a human life; the nature of the soul or self; and the question as to whether there is a difference between true and false pleasure, i.
Socrates too starts to speak at length, sounds rhetorical at times, and ends the discussion with a myth. Callicles advances a substantive position grounded in a version of the distinction between nature and convention and defends it. These transgressions of rhetorical genres to one side, from Socrates' standpoint the ultimate philosophical question at stake concerns how one should live one's life c. Readers of the dialogue will differ as to whether or not the arguments there offered decide the matter. The nub of the debate is as current today, both in academic and non-academic contexts, as it was in Plato's day.
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Is all of rhetoric bad? Are we to avoid—indeed, can we avoid—rhetoric altogether? Even in the Gorgias , as we have seen, there is a distinction between rhetoric that instills belief, and rhetoric that instills knowledge, and later in the dialogue a form of noble rhetoric is mentioned, though no examples of its practitioners can be found a-b.
The Phaedrus offers a more detailed explanation of this distinction. Readers of the Phaedrus have often wondered how the dialogue hangs together. A slightly closer look reveals that any such simple characterization is misleading, because the first half is also about rhetoric, in several different ways.
The other two are rhetorical as well, and presented as efforts to persuade a young beloved. All three are justly viewed as rhetorical masterstrokes by Plato, but for different reasons. The first is a brilliantly executed parody of the style of Lysias an orator and speech writer of significant repute.
It is mostly an allegory cast in the form of a myth, and tells the story of true love and of the soul's journeys in the cosmos human and divine. The themes of poetry and rhetoric, then, are intertwined in the Phaedrus. It looks initially as though both rhetoric and poetry have gained significant stature, at least relative to their status in the Ion , Republic , and Gorgias. I will begin by focusing primarily on rhetoric, and then turn to the question of poetry, even though the two themes are closely connected in this dialogue. The answer to this crucial question constitutes one of the most famous contributions to the topic.
In essence, Socrates argues that someone who is going to speak well and nobly must know the truth about the subject he is going to discuss. The sort of theory Polus and Callicles maintained in the Gorgias is false see Phaedrus e4—a4. How to show that it is an art after all? Quite a number of claimants to rhetoric are named and reviewed, and readers who have an interest in the history of Greek rhetoric rightly find these passages invaluable. Many rhetoricians have artfully and effectively misled their audiences, and Socrates argues—somewhat implausibly perhaps—that in order to mislead one cannot oneself be misled.
It will not only be coherent, but structured in a way that mirrors the way the subject itself is naturally organized. This will not be truly accomplished if it only looks that way; to be that way, a discourse's unity should reflect the unity of its subject. At this point we might want to ask about the audience ; after all, the rhetorician is trying to persuade someone of something.
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